The Problem of the Unmanned Airspace

In their publication, Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System Roadmap, the Federal Aviation Administration offers us a brief understanding of the challenges that must be addressed, and ultimately overcome, in order to adequately satisfy the safety and security needs of operating unmanned systems publicly (2013). In regards to how we are going to overcome the challenge of separating unmanned systems and deconflicting flight paths, they discuss the need for ground-based sense and avoid (SAA) systems and airborne SAA systems. Included in these discussions are the airspace class restrictions. For example, the FAA seems to be integrating unmanned systems into the existing airspace class designations in order to incorporate rather than creating a new airspace class to accommodate.

To be completely honest, I’m not sure if I agree with this path of action. Incorporating numberless, tiny (comparatively) unmanned systems into an existing airspace system seems to be a deconfliction nightmare. If, however, the FAA created a separate airspace class, let’s call it Class J airspace, that restricts travel within this airspace exclusively to smaller, commercial and personal usage unmanned systems, then the majority of deconfliction has already been accomplished. Within this airspace, travel lanes and specific rules for altitude depending on direction could easily tackle the majority of traffic avoidance concerns. Most of this unmanned air traffic could occur between 200-400 feet, below the allowable altitude for congested and less-than-congested airspace.

In the event that a helicopter or other designated manned aircraft needs to drop below 600 feet due to approved mission requirements or emergency requirements, then the sense and avoid systems could be utilized and be compatible with the other modes (FAA, 2013, pg. 22). However, this should be the exception, so as to avoid oversaturation and strain on the airspace system.

Not every unmanned system would be able to utilize Class J airspace. Larger unmanned systems, or unmanned systems that fulfill identical roles to manned systems, should be treated as a manned system for the purposes of traffic avoidance. However, rather than a “see and avoid” system of rules, a sense and avoid system should follow the same rules and programmed (if autonomous) or applied (if remotely piloted) to the unmanned system.

Ultimately, the issue of traffic avoidance in unmanned systems is a complicated one. The FAA is hard at work towards a solution. However, I genuinely hope that the FAA uses all options and scenarios to assist them in the decision making process – even if that means creating a new airspace class and a new infrastructure to accommodate the problem of unmanned airspace. Doing so, may prove costly initially, but would undoubtedly pay off in the economically beneficial world of unmanned systems.

Reference

Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems in    the national airspace system roadmap (First Edition). Retrieved from             http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf

The Systems Engineering Challenge - How to Resolve Conflict

Problem background:

A UAS is to be designed for precision crop-dusting. In the middle of the design process, the system is found to be overweight.

• Two subsystems – 1) Guidance, Navigation & Control [flying correctly] and 2) Payload delivery [spraying correctly] have attempted to save costs by purchasing off-the-shelf hardware, rather than a custom design, resulting in both going over their originally allotted weight budgets. Each team has suggested that the OTHER team reduce weight to compensate.
• The UAS will not be able to carry sufficient weight to spread the specified (Marketing has already talked this up to customers) amount of fertilizer over the specified area without cutting into the fuel margin. The safety engineers are uncomfortable with the idea of changing the fuel margin at all.

What are your considerations? What are your priorities? What do you think about the future prospects for the “next generation, enhanced” version of the system as a result of your approach?

Having never fulfilled the systems engineering position, I’m unsure what kind of power or authority the systems engineer would possess. However, from my experience in the military, I would take a very forward and up-front approach to solving the problem. I would delegate and hold people accountable to their task responsibility as well as their team responsibility.

I believe it’s clear in this scenario that a few bottom-line system requirements have been established. These bottom-line requirements must be met in order to satisfy the needs of the customer, and ultimately win the contract. In other words, keep your eye on the finish line (Ryen, 2008). The first requirement is the amount of fertilizer that will be spread and the other is the amount of fuel that will be carried. Without satisfying the fertilizer issue, there won’t be any customers, thus nullifying the contract. The fuel issue is an issue of safety. In aviation, safety is paramount to the successful operation of any aircraft. Without optimal safety practices, laws, public perception, and customer support will be impossible to satisfy. Therefore, the amount of fertilizer cannot be reduced and the amount of fuel cannot be reduced. Those are the higher priorities. Logically, that means that either the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) team or the Payload Delivery team must change their design to accommodate for the added weight.

As the systems engineer I would tell the GNC team and the Payload Delivery team to both reduce weight, in whatever way possible. Of course, I would offer solutions and suggestions, but I will never do another’s job for them simply because they are too stubborn to compromise. Some of those solutions might be to use lighter material in the structures of each system. Because they were using off-the-shelf products are they fully utilizing all structural weight saving options? For example, could the GNC team use aluminum? Might the Payload Delivery team be able to use a polyester impregnated fiberglass as the tank for the payload, thus reducing weight? Both options might increase cost; however, it’s unlikely the cost would be so significant as to put the project over-budget. Ultimately, one or both of the teams must give, even if it means slightly increased cost and slightly lowering profit margins. At the end of the day, securing the customer’s satisfaction is the ultimate priority – without it, nobody gets paid.

In the processes for future aircraft, I would begin by establishing the expectation noted above. Yet, the blame cannot completely fall with the teams for this mid-design hiccup. Ultimately boundaries and limitations on weight, design, and function should have been clearly stated by the systems engineer before the teams embarked on accomplishing their tasks. For example, in a future project perhaps the GNC team would be given a maximum weight of 300 pounds and the Payload Delivery team a max weight of 100 pounds. With these thresholds established, no time, effort, and money would be wasted as energies are kept within the bounds established by the limitations. For future projects, that process of clearly defining limitations would effectively reduce or even eliminate collisions between different teams in designing the system.

Reference

Ryen, E. (2008, March 1). Overview of the system engineering process. Retrieved from             https://www.dot.nd.gov/divisions/maintenance/docs/OverviewOfSEA.pdf

Comparison of the Kaman HTK-1 from 1957 and the Kaman KMAX of today

The two unmanned systems I’d like to compare are the Kaman HTK-1 and the Kaman KMAX helicopters. Both are full-sized helicopters that employ remote piloting. The Kaman HTK-1 was utilized in 1953 and the Kaman KMAX is still in use today, but was developed in the early 1990’s.

The Kaman HTK-1 was essentially an H-43 Huskie, the most successful search and rescue aircraft in Vietnam, but outfitted with remote piloting capability. The H-43 Huskie was unique in many ways. Its most pronounced feature is its inter-meshing rotors. Eliminating the tail rotor allowed 100% of the engine power to be applied to the main rotors, losing nothing to counter-rotating effects that other helicopters employ.

Produced in 1957, the HTK-1 was the first remotely controlled and non-tethered aircraft ever flown (Kaman, 2015). It employed radio controls that were limited by line-of-sight radio frequencies. Additionally, the remote pilot’s visual capabilities were limited to primitive cameras and black and white television sets. That might not seem like a substantial limitation by today’s television and camera standards but the recording capabilities of that time were far more rudimentary. Even with the weight savings of a pilotless helicopter, the HTK-1 only saw limited use – its full potential was never realized.

With the advent of modern warfare, including improvised explosive devices and guerilla type warfare employed by American adversaries in the War on Terror, a new need was spawned. Convoys delivering goods and supplies to soldiers and marines in hostile territory often proved dangerous and deadly. Even flying goods to austere places not only risked lives but increased monetary costs as well. As a result, the Kaman KMAX unmanned helicopter, still employing the iconic inter-meshing rotors but upgraded in countless ways for true remote piloting, found an essential niche to become a viable option for the military. The KMAX can be loaded with supplies (up to 6,000 pounds), and delivered remotely to troops. The cost of doing the same mission using the Black Hawk or the CH-47 Chinook are substantially greater, not to mention the risk of lives lost. The Kaman KMAX flew its first operational mission in 2011 (Dorr, 2012).

With the existing camera tracking and sensing technology, and the emerging adversary engagement technology, these supply moving helicopters could even have self-defense capabilities. This could eliminate or reduce the chance of aircraft loss to enemy attack. However, the benefits of such a system would need to outweigh the added cost and weight.

References

Unmanned Aerial Systems. (2015). Retrieved November 22, 2015, from                           http://www.kaman.com/aerospace/aerosystems/air-vehicles-mro/products-  services/unmanned-aerial-systems/

Dorr, R. (2012, January 19). Less Than a Year After His Death, Charlie Kaman's Helicopters Achieve Another First. Retrieved November 22, 2015, from http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/                 stories/charlie-kamans-helicopters-achieve-another-first-nearly-a-year-after-his-death/