A Case for the Case Analysis

In my Master's Course, Unmanned Aerospace Systems, we had to complete a Case Analysis. In this case analysis, we researched, developed, and presented a case revolving around a significant issue in the world of unmanned systems. My case analysis delved into the problem of traffic management in unmanned systems.

First and foremost, I think a Case Analysis approach to analyzing anything is all about learning by doing. The Case Analysis forces you to examine the case by all angles and perspectives. By the end of the presentation (if you did your case analysis correctly), you are very confident in your position. You could argue your position with legitimacy.

I think perhaps the most beneficial aspect of performing a case analysis is identifying the "Significance of the Issue." In past papers or presentations I have made for a class or professionally, there's a temptation to skim through the significance of the issue. In those past experiences, occasionally I secretly hoped that others would either not see the plot holes in my analysis or that they would be too lazy to investigate them themselves - thereby I was able to maintain a semblance of expertise. However, when you truly examine the significance of an issue or problem you are able to identify all of the problems and holes. In doing so, you are forced to address those problems and can ACTUALLY maintain expertise when those problems are identified by a third-party.

The second point that the case analysis forces you to consider is the advantages and disadvantages of ALL solutions - not just the disadvantages of the solution you don't like and the advantages of the one you do. In other words, in examining all of the pros and cons, you are able to determine if the solution you prefer is actually the best solution. Often, in my case analysis, I found myself convincing myself that a previously harbored idea may not be the best one. As a result, my proposal changed into something different than where I started - but it changed into something better.

In all, though it was a difficult project (the longest paper I've had to complete toward my Master's degree), I am grateful to have taken part in it. Again, it forced learning upon me by forcing action. As a result, my confidence in the issue grew as I realized that my expertise on the issue was increasing as well. I have no doubt that I can and will use lessons I learned from this case analysis in my future courses and my professional life. I will be better capable of identifying the true problem and critiquing the solutions.

Request for Proposal: Unmanned Systems in Post-Natural Disasters

The 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan left more than 15,000 dead, with roughly 9,000 bodies recovered in the days and weeks later (Oskin, 2015). Many of those people may have been alive for hours or even days after the event. Such an astronomical number of needless dead prompt the question of how could it be avoided? One solution likely could have contributed to hundreds of saved lives: unmanned aerial vehicles.

In preventing the future loss of life in similar catastrophes, the author submits a request for proposal, to produce a UAS that would help identify and locate the living amongst the destruction created by earthquakes, tornados, tsunamis, and hurricanes among other natural disasters. The aircraft will need sufficient loiter capability, endurance, and payload capacity to accommodate the equipment necessary to make it a reasonable and viable solution to the problem. Some of the baseline and derived requirements, as well as testing and timeline requirements are listed below:

1.       Baseline Requirements

1.1   Air Vehicle Element

1.1.1          Shall have an endurance of at least 5 hours

1.1.2          Shall have a loiter speed of a maximum of 30 miles per hour

1.1.3          Shall have a typical cruising altitude of 400 feet

1.1.4          Shall be deployable on-station in less than 15 minutes

1.1.5          Shall house power-plant to vehicle

1.1.6          Shall house a separate power-plant to payload

1.2   Payload

1.2.1          Shall be capable of color daytime video operation of up to 1000 feet AGL

1.2.2          Shall be capable of infrared (IFR) video operation of up to 1000 feet AGL

1.2.3          Shall be capable of 360° lateral video operation regardless of airframe heading

1.2.4          Shall provide capability to provide real-time data to controllers and search and rescue personnel on the ground

1.2.5          Shall be capable of transmitting locations of targets to within 10 meters to operators

1.3   Communications and Control

1.3.1          Shall be capable of manual operations

1.3.2          Shall be capable of autonomous orbit operations around a target

1.3.3          Shall operate on available frequency that does not interfere with other search and rescue signals

1.3.4          Shall be protected from exterior data-link threats

1.3.5          Shall have a radius of action of at least 10 miles

2.       Testing Requirements

2.1   Air Vehicle Element

2.1.1          Conduct ground test of power-plant operation at cruising power to ensure at least 5 hours of operation

2.1.2          Conduct controlled ground test of system speed capacity to ensure stall speed is no greater than 30 miles per hour

2.1.3          Test the timeframe to assemble and operate the system from support vehicle to lift-off

2.1.4          Inspect power-plant, airframe, and systems after various tests to identify stresses if any

2.2   Payload

2.2.1          Conduct ground test of 360° lateral video operation while installed on airframe

2.2.2          Test daytime video for adequate operation up to a distance of 1000 feet

2.2.3          Conduct nighttime video for infrared operation up to a distance of 1000 feet

2.2.4          Test the GPS targeting system to ensure target location to within 10 meters.

2.3   Communication and Control

2.3.1          Conduct “hacking” test to ensure security of data-link systems

2.3.2          Conduct ground test of manual controls

2.3.3          Conduct controlled ground test of software to ensure autonomous orbit capability

2.3.4          Test acceptable performance of radio transmission and reception up to 10 miles

2.4   Flight/Operational Test

2.4.1          Conduct a timed flight of 5 hours and a reach of 10 miles while conducting:

2.4.1.1    Test of manual controls

2.4.1.2    Test of autonomous controls and orbit

2.4.1.3    Test of real-time video

2.4.1.3.1           Daytime color video

2.4.1.3.2           Nighttime IFR

2.4.1.4    Operational test of deployment time of 15 minutes or less

3.       Timeline:

Concept Design and Research: 14 weeks

Preliminary Design and Detail Design: 10 weeks

Ground Systems Tests: 2 weeks

Prototype Build and Operational Tests: 14 weeks

Development and Certification: 12 weeks

Production: 12 months

Total Timeline: 24 months

Ultimately, this timeline is relatively short. The argument for this is that the majority of system requirements could be fulfilled by commercially-off-the-shelf (COTS) products. The airframe, power plant, video systems, and data-link systems could be garnered from already produced products. The challenge would be to effectively integrate these systems into a collaborative whole.

The production time only consists of 36%. The justification for this is the aforementioned point of using COTS products. The production time would mainly entail assembly of COTS into a usable system.

The design phases accumulate to more than 30% of the total design-to-operational-use window. The rationale for this is the inevitable and time consuming decomposition of low-level requirements (Leowen, 2013). For example, one of the low level requirements is to accomplish a loitering orbit, but what if the wind is relatively constant from the East? The aircraft will need to be able to compensate for weather. As a result, the aircraft should also provide weather monitoring and wind-speed measurements to the operators. All of these factors and more will add to the total equation and must be considered in the design phases.

Considering the loiter, endurance, and payload requirements, the airframe will more than likely need to be a fixed wing aircraft with either a catapult launch capability or a hand-launch capability. However, with the power plant needed to satisfy the endurance requirements, hand launch may not be feasible. Regardless, test-site considerations should be deliberated. Additionally, considering the dangerous and austere environments it will be employed, a parachute recovery may also be considered and implemented.

References:

Leowen, H. (2013). Requirements based UAV design process explained. Retrieved from                                       http://www.micropilot.com/pdf/requirements-based-uav.pdf

Oskin, B. (2015, May 7). Japan earthquake & tsunami of 2011: facts and information. Retrieved from                 http://www.livescience.com/39110-japan-2011-earthquake-tsunami-facts.html

Unmanned Aerial Systems in Law Enforcement

The potential uses of unmanned systems stretch across a wide range of missions and tasks – anything from farming to national border security.  However, there is one area of unmanned aerial systems usage that is particularly interesting to me.  My brother is a law enforcement officer in the State of Utah.  Utah Highway Patrol owns and uses a helicopter for various law enforcement uses. The uses of helicopters and airplanes in law enforcement include, vehicle pursuit, firefighting, counterterrorism, traffic control, surveillance and even prisoner transport.  The problem with using aircraft in law enforcement is the cost. 

My brother, who has a family of four, makes a very modest $40,000 per year to perform the essential job of keeping his community safe. Yet, a Bell 206 JetRanger costs around $1 million, the equivalent of the yearly salaries of 25 police officers like my brother.  Needless to say, the costs of obtaining and maintaining aircraft significantly cut into the budgets of law enforcement around the country. The U.S. Department of Justice reported that the average yearly cost of maintaining and flying helicopters in law enforcement approaches $300,000, with only 1,100 hours of operation (2009).  That doesn’t include the original purchase price of the aircraft, or the salaries, certification, and training of the pilots and maintenance personnel.

            The three systems that I would like to highlight that could easily fulfill these tasks are the Puma AE, the UAVS Phoenix 60, and the AeroEnvironment Qube UAS. The Puma AE is a fixed wing aircraft that is large enough to accommodate most of the equipment needed to fulfill the majority of law enforcement operations. It has a range of 10 miles, a speed of 60 miles per hour, and a loiter time of 3.5 hours. With a price tag of roughly $30,000, it is 3% of the cost of a Bell 206, and has a minute fraction of the hourly cost to operate – all the while being capable of performing 96% of the law enforcement mission currently provided by manned systems (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009).

            The UAVS Phoenix 60 is a far cheaper option, however it eliminates some capabilities compared to the Puma. This UAS is a 15 pound quadrotor capable of 40 minutes of flight and VTOL and hover operations. This drone would be used within line-of sight operations only utilizing the many visual and observational technologies it provides. The range and endurance could limit operations, for example it wouldn’t be very feasible for vehicle or personnel pursuits in most cases. However, those missions only account for 2.5% of law enforcement aviation operations (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009). The estimated cost of this system is $10,000. The cost savings may very well be worth the limitations.

The AeroEnvironment Qube is similar in capability to the Phoenix 60, but is even smaller which provides more flexibility in operations. For example, if a foot pursuit begins, the Qube could be tethered to a police vehicle – thus increasing its endurance and enhancing its range to that of the vehicle. With the bird’s eye view, law enforcement could satisfy most of the mission requirements. However, being so small it may have difficulty performing another significant mission of UAS in law enforcement: traffic citations. Traffic citations account for 20% of the law enforcement mission for aviation (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009). In order to give citations, the UAS must have certain equipment aboard to detect the citation.  With a payload of only 3 pounds, it’s uncertain if this UAS could manage the equipment properly.

            Using unmanned systems do not come without negatives, however. The public perception of drones flying around observing people is less than positive – even though manned law enforcement aircraft are already doing that. In many states, legislation has been enacted requiring probable cause warrants before drones may be used in an investigation (Harris, 2014). Additionally, safety would be a concern. Without the robust and hardened capabilities of a helicopter, these UAS are more susceptible to weather and adversary conditions.  The public concern for safety in the event of a crash must be considered.

            In summary, the cost benefits and savings of using UAS would substantially boost the capabilities of law enforcement around the country. Perhaps the savings could even be applied to the salaries of the officers on the ground, or in boosting their equipment and safety gear. Ultimately, it’s the people of this country that we want to benefit, and UAS in law enforcement would greatly help in that effort.

Reference

U.S. Department of Justice. (2009). Aviation units in large law enforcement agencies,        2007(NCJ 226672). Retrieved from http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aullea07.pdf

Harris, S. (2014, October). Unmanned aerial vehicles: more than a surveillance tool. The Police     Chief, (81), 66-67.

The Problem of the Unmanned Airspace

In their publication, Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace System Roadmap, the Federal Aviation Administration offers us a brief understanding of the challenges that must be addressed, and ultimately overcome, in order to adequately satisfy the safety and security needs of operating unmanned systems publicly (2013). In regards to how we are going to overcome the challenge of separating unmanned systems and deconflicting flight paths, they discuss the need for ground-based sense and avoid (SAA) systems and airborne SAA systems. Included in these discussions are the airspace class restrictions. For example, the FAA seems to be integrating unmanned systems into the existing airspace class designations in order to incorporate rather than creating a new airspace class to accommodate.

To be completely honest, I’m not sure if I agree with this path of action. Incorporating numberless, tiny (comparatively) unmanned systems into an existing airspace system seems to be a deconfliction nightmare. If, however, the FAA created a separate airspace class, let’s call it Class J airspace, that restricts travel within this airspace exclusively to smaller, commercial and personal usage unmanned systems, then the majority of deconfliction has already been accomplished. Within this airspace, travel lanes and specific rules for altitude depending on direction could easily tackle the majority of traffic avoidance concerns. Most of this unmanned air traffic could occur between 200-400 feet, below the allowable altitude for congested and less-than-congested airspace.

In the event that a helicopter or other designated manned aircraft needs to drop below 600 feet due to approved mission requirements or emergency requirements, then the sense and avoid systems could be utilized and be compatible with the other modes (FAA, 2013, pg. 22). However, this should be the exception, so as to avoid oversaturation and strain on the airspace system.

Not every unmanned system would be able to utilize Class J airspace. Larger unmanned systems, or unmanned systems that fulfill identical roles to manned systems, should be treated as a manned system for the purposes of traffic avoidance. However, rather than a “see and avoid” system of rules, a sense and avoid system should follow the same rules and programmed (if autonomous) or applied (if remotely piloted) to the unmanned system.

Ultimately, the issue of traffic avoidance in unmanned systems is a complicated one. The FAA is hard at work towards a solution. However, I genuinely hope that the FAA uses all options and scenarios to assist them in the decision making process – even if that means creating a new airspace class and a new infrastructure to accommodate the problem of unmanned airspace. Doing so, may prove costly initially, but would undoubtedly pay off in the economically beneficial world of unmanned systems.

Reference

Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems in    the national airspace system roadmap (First Edition). Retrieved from             http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf

The Systems Engineering Challenge - How to Resolve Conflict

Problem background:

A UAS is to be designed for precision crop-dusting. In the middle of the design process, the system is found to be overweight.

• Two subsystems – 1) Guidance, Navigation & Control [flying correctly] and 2) Payload delivery [spraying correctly] have attempted to save costs by purchasing off-the-shelf hardware, rather than a custom design, resulting in both going over their originally allotted weight budgets. Each team has suggested that the OTHER team reduce weight to compensate.
• The UAS will not be able to carry sufficient weight to spread the specified (Marketing has already talked this up to customers) amount of fertilizer over the specified area without cutting into the fuel margin. The safety engineers are uncomfortable with the idea of changing the fuel margin at all.

What are your considerations? What are your priorities? What do you think about the future prospects for the “next generation, enhanced” version of the system as a result of your approach?

Having never fulfilled the systems engineering position, I’m unsure what kind of power or authority the systems engineer would possess. However, from my experience in the military, I would take a very forward and up-front approach to solving the problem. I would delegate and hold people accountable to their task responsibility as well as their team responsibility.

I believe it’s clear in this scenario that a few bottom-line system requirements have been established. These bottom-line requirements must be met in order to satisfy the needs of the customer, and ultimately win the contract. In other words, keep your eye on the finish line (Ryen, 2008). The first requirement is the amount of fertilizer that will be spread and the other is the amount of fuel that will be carried. Without satisfying the fertilizer issue, there won’t be any customers, thus nullifying the contract. The fuel issue is an issue of safety. In aviation, safety is paramount to the successful operation of any aircraft. Without optimal safety practices, laws, public perception, and customer support will be impossible to satisfy. Therefore, the amount of fertilizer cannot be reduced and the amount of fuel cannot be reduced. Those are the higher priorities. Logically, that means that either the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) team or the Payload Delivery team must change their design to accommodate for the added weight.

As the systems engineer I would tell the GNC team and the Payload Delivery team to both reduce weight, in whatever way possible. Of course, I would offer solutions and suggestions, but I will never do another’s job for them simply because they are too stubborn to compromise. Some of those solutions might be to use lighter material in the structures of each system. Because they were using off-the-shelf products are they fully utilizing all structural weight saving options? For example, could the GNC team use aluminum? Might the Payload Delivery team be able to use a polyester impregnated fiberglass as the tank for the payload, thus reducing weight? Both options might increase cost; however, it’s unlikely the cost would be so significant as to put the project over-budget. Ultimately, one or both of the teams must give, even if it means slightly increased cost and slightly lowering profit margins. At the end of the day, securing the customer’s satisfaction is the ultimate priority – without it, nobody gets paid.

In the processes for future aircraft, I would begin by establishing the expectation noted above. Yet, the blame cannot completely fall with the teams for this mid-design hiccup. Ultimately boundaries and limitations on weight, design, and function should have been clearly stated by the systems engineer before the teams embarked on accomplishing their tasks. For example, in a future project perhaps the GNC team would be given a maximum weight of 300 pounds and the Payload Delivery team a max weight of 100 pounds. With these thresholds established, no time, effort, and money would be wasted as energies are kept within the bounds established by the limitations. For future projects, that process of clearly defining limitations would effectively reduce or even eliminate collisions between different teams in designing the system.

Reference

Ryen, E. (2008, March 1). Overview of the system engineering process. Retrieved from             https://www.dot.nd.gov/divisions/maintenance/docs/OverviewOfSEA.pdf

Comparison of the Kaman HTK-1 from 1957 and the Kaman KMAX of today

The two unmanned systems I’d like to compare are the Kaman HTK-1 and the Kaman KMAX helicopters. Both are full-sized helicopters that employ remote piloting. The Kaman HTK-1 was utilized in 1953 and the Kaman KMAX is still in use today, but was developed in the early 1990’s.

The Kaman HTK-1 was essentially an H-43 Huskie, the most successful search and rescue aircraft in Vietnam, but outfitted with remote piloting capability. The H-43 Huskie was unique in many ways. Its most pronounced feature is its inter-meshing rotors. Eliminating the tail rotor allowed 100% of the engine power to be applied to the main rotors, losing nothing to counter-rotating effects that other helicopters employ.

Produced in 1957, the HTK-1 was the first remotely controlled and non-tethered aircraft ever flown (Kaman, 2015). It employed radio controls that were limited by line-of-sight radio frequencies. Additionally, the remote pilot’s visual capabilities were limited to primitive cameras and black and white television sets. That might not seem like a substantial limitation by today’s television and camera standards but the recording capabilities of that time were far more rudimentary. Even with the weight savings of a pilotless helicopter, the HTK-1 only saw limited use – its full potential was never realized.

With the advent of modern warfare, including improvised explosive devices and guerilla type warfare employed by American adversaries in the War on Terror, a new need was spawned. Convoys delivering goods and supplies to soldiers and marines in hostile territory often proved dangerous and deadly. Even flying goods to austere places not only risked lives but increased monetary costs as well. As a result, the Kaman KMAX unmanned helicopter, still employing the iconic inter-meshing rotors but upgraded in countless ways for true remote piloting, found an essential niche to become a viable option for the military. The KMAX can be loaded with supplies (up to 6,000 pounds), and delivered remotely to troops. The cost of doing the same mission using the Black Hawk or the CH-47 Chinook are substantially greater, not to mention the risk of lives lost. The Kaman KMAX flew its first operational mission in 2011 (Dorr, 2012).

With the existing camera tracking and sensing technology, and the emerging adversary engagement technology, these supply moving helicopters could even have self-defense capabilities. This could eliminate or reduce the chance of aircraft loss to enemy attack. However, the benefits of such a system would need to outweigh the added cost and weight.

References

Unmanned Aerial Systems. (2015). Retrieved November 22, 2015, from                           http://www.kaman.com/aerospace/aerosystems/air-vehicles-mro/products-  services/unmanned-aerial-systems/

Dorr, R. (2012, January 19). Less Than a Year After His Death, Charlie Kaman's Helicopters Achieve Another First. Retrieved November 22, 2015, from http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/                 stories/charlie-kamans-helicopters-achieve-another-first-nearly-a-year-after-his-death/